The behavior of the Federal Reserve has often been modeled using monetary policy reaction functions, which empirically link a policy instrument, perhaps an interest rate or a monetary aggregate, to economic goal variables like inflation, output growth, and unemployment. Under the assumption of a stable macroeconomic structure, estimated reaction function coefficients reveal information about the weights the Fed attaches to the various goal variables. More generally, reaction functions conveniently describe the implicit policy rule the Fed has followed over a given sample period. 1 Reaction functions have also been used to investigate the role of political forces on monetary policies. Some findings support the existence of a political business cycle pattern in which monetary ease IS observed before elections. 2 A somewhat stronger case can be made for the existence of partIsan influences from Presidential administrations. 3 Conventional wisdom suggests that Democratic administrations prefer "easy" monetary policies, whIle Republican admmistrations prefer monetary "tightness" If Presidents can influence members ofthe Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC), the Fed's primary policy-making unit, then monetary policy IS likely to shift with partisan changes in the Presidency Empirical studies have modeled such partisan mfluences by adding a dummy variable indicating the party of the President to monetary policy reaction functions, or by estimating separate reaction functions for periods of Democratic and Republican leadership. Most studies show some systematic partisan mfluence.
The preceding argument assumes that a PresIdent's partisan impact on monetary policy is a result of dIrect influence over FOMC members,4 but another channel of influence IS also available. Members of the Fed's Board of Governors, who are FOMC members, are appointed by the President. One would expect that partisan preferences would affect the appointments process, and evidence from analyses of FOMC voting patterns supports this view. 5 Specifications for aggregate reaction functIOns (i.e., those describing the behavior of the Fed as a whole) cannot easily capture partIsan influences resulting from the appointments process. The seven Governors serve overlapping terms of fourteen years, so Presidents make appointments mfrequently as terms expire or as Governors resign. ThIS implies that changes m the partisan makeup of the FOMC follow changes in the partisan status of the Presidential administration in a delayed, gradual, and somewhat irregular manner. Including a dummy variable for the party of the incumbent President in an aggregate reaction function is not likely to fully capture partisan influences by way of the appointments process.
In this paper we investigate the sources of partisan influence on monetary policy-making using a technique that overcomes limitations of the aggregate reaction function approach. We develop a method for estimating reaction function parameters that vary across mdLV~dual members of the FOMC. Our estimates permit us to infer whether members are directly influenced by the partisan ideology of the current President, and whether they systematically differ according to the party of the President who appomted them If influence flows through both channels, we can assess the relative importance ofthe two.
Apart from its focus on the channels of partisan influence, our analysis is distinguished in three important ways from previous studies that have estimated aggregate reaction functIOns or analyzed FOMC voting patterns. First, our model links policy outcomes to the reaction functions of individuals serving on the FOMC. This linkage provides micro foundations for aggregate reaction functions and permits an empirical appraisal of the balance of power between the Chairman and other FOMC members. Second, by specifying variations across individuals as differences in reaction function parameters, we can control for the state of the economy and prevailing policy stances when we assess individuals' FOMC voting records. Some FOMC members may have frequently dissented favoring tightness not because their preferences were much different from other members, but because policy was unusually "easy" during their tenures, or because inflationary conditIOns warranted additional tightness. ThIrd, the use of reaction fun ctions permits us to interpret differences across individuals in terms of desired settings for a policy instrument. Such comparisons are more meaningful indicators of pohcy preferences than dissent voting frequencies are.
Our findings will also address broader macroeconomic Issues. Keech [1986, 1988] and Alesma and Sachs [1988] have proposed models m which partisan changes drive electorally timed business cycles. In these models newly elected Presidential administrations can alter the stance of monetary policy to reflect their partisan preferences. Because election outcomes are uncer-tain, partisan shifts m monetary pohcies contain surprise elements that produce business cycle fluctuations. However, If the appointments process provides the major channel of partisan influence, then shifts in monetary policies will lag the election and dimimsh the importance of election surprises. A finding to this effect would undermine these models of partisan political business cycles.
We begin in Section I by describing our model and the method used to estimate it. The data employed and the empirical specification are presented in Section II. Empirical results are presented in Section III, and extensions are discussed in Section IV. Section V offers conclusions.
I. A MODEL OF FOMe DECISION MAKING
FOMe members' votes on monetary pohcy directives are observable, but these votes do not directly reveal individuals' most preferred policies. As a result, previous studies have not attempted to estimate conventional policy reaction functions for individuals.
Here we develop a model of FOMe decision making that permits reaction function parameters to vary across committee members and that can be estimated using available macroeconomic tIme series and FOMe voting records. 6 Our presentation in thIS section proceeds by discussmg the specification of policy preferences of individual FOMe members, the linkage between those preferences and resulting policy outcomes, FOMe voting behavior, and issues assocIated wIth estImation.
A. Individuals' Reactwn Functions
As in aggregate reaction function analyses, we must designate a specific variable as the policy instrument controlled by the Fed. We have chosen the Federal funds rate for that purpose ThIS choice could be challenged on the grounds that the Fed is unable to manipulate the funds rate or that it has chosen alternative targets. However, most observers agree that the Fed has targeted the funds rate with considerable success over the postwar period. 7 Some have 6 Tootell [1991a 6 Tootell [ , 1991 1 has estimated mdlvldual-level reactIOn functIOns, but the dependent varIable in hIS reactIon functIOns IS a categOrIcal varIable based on FOMe votes HIS varIable deSCrIbes a member's preferred polIcy m relatIOn to current polIcy (1 e , tighter, eaSler, or no change) In contrast, we estImate mdlvldual reactIOn functIOns that speCIfy a deSIred settmg for a polIcy mstrument as the dependent varIable, as do most aggregate reactIOn functIOn studIes 7 Most empIrIcal studIes show that, at a mmImum, the Fed has attempted to mfluence short-run mterest rates over most of the perIod studIed m thIS paper In reactIOn functIOn contexts Beck [1982] and FaIr [1984] prOVIde confirmmg eVIdence
even argued that the funds rate remained a target during the 1979-1982 interlude when the Fed ostensibly adopted a nonborrowed reserve operating procedure. For example, Goodfriend [1990] reports that "except for the period from 1934 to the end of the 1940s when short term interest rates were near zero or pegged, the Fed has always employed either a direct or an indirect Federal funds rate policy instrument."
We specify individuals' reaction functions so that partisan differences across FOMC members can be represented very simply. We assume that each of the N members of the FOMC (excluding the Chairman) has a desired interest rate reaction function of the following form: 8
The dependent variable r~t is member i's desired Federal funds rate for the intermeeting period following meeting t. This variable is unobserved. The independent variables ~t,j = 1, ... , J, are those that vary over time but not across individuals. Among these are forecast values of macroeconomic variables of concern to the Fed (e.g., inflation, unemployment, and growth). The ~t also include dummy variables to indicate the partisan identity of the current President, which should capture the effects of systematic partisan influence from the President and the executive branch in general.
The remaining independent variables D klt , k = 1, ... , K vary across both members and time. Specifically included are dummy variables indicating Governors appointed by Republican and Democratic Presidents, which capture partisan influences channeled through the power of appointment. The model could be generalized to include other measures of individual characteristics or individualspecific dummies, but here we limit our attention to partisan distinctions. Note that the parameters in (1) are not subscripted by i; we assume that differences between members are completely de- Cook and Hahn [1989] , by exarmmng interest rate reactions to changes In Fed target rates, show that the Fed Influences not only the Federal funds rate but also longer term interest rates Bernanke and Bhnder [1992] prOVIde eVIdence that movements In the funds rate are pnmarlly a consequence of Fed pohcles rather than money demand shifts, and they also argue that the funds rate IS the best predIctor of future movements of real macroeconomIC variables 8. When there are no vacanCIeS or absences on the FOMC, N = 11 scribed by intercept shifts captured by the coefficients of the partisan appointment variables. While this characterization of differences is restrictive, data limitations argue against ncher distinctions. We specify a sImilar desired mterest rate reaction functlOn for the Chairman (who is mdicated by the position index 0) which differs only slightly from that for other FOMC members:
The partisan appointment dummies of equation (1) are replaced m equation (2) by a senes of dummy variables, Cmt, m = 1, . , M, indIcating specific Chairmen (e.g., Volcker, MIller, etc.). ThIS specificatlOn is more general than one that would require each Chairman's intercept to match those of other members falhng under the same partisan appointment category GIven the special mfluence often attributed to the Chairman, and glVen the small number of Chairmen serving in our sample period, this generalization seems appropriate. Because some Chairmen have been appointed by Presidents of both parties, the proper coding of partisan attachments would be questionable in any case. We continue to assume that coefficients of other variables in the reaction function are Identical for Chmrmen and other members.
Error terms for the reaction functions (1) and (2) are assumed to be identically distributed normal random variables that are un correlated over time and across indivlduals: 9 E(e ,t ) = 0, E(e~) = (T2,
E(e,tejs) = 0, for l ;c J or t ;c s.
B. Monetary Policy ChOlces and FOMC Votlng
Monetary pohcy directives are adopted by a majonty vote of the FOMC at regularly scheduled meetings of the commIttee In these meetings the discussion of monetary policy typically begins with the presentation of a staff report that assesses current macroeconomic conditions and provides forecasts under alternative policy scenarios. This is followed by the policy "go-around" m whlCh individual FOMC members present additlOnal mformatlOn and broach policy strategies. The Chairman (or occasionally a member designated by the Chairman) then suggests a proposal for the monetary poliey directive. If further discussion indicates that this proposal is deemed suitable by a majority of the voting committee members, then final language for the directive is crafted, and a formal vote is taken. In practice, formal votes are taken only when approval by a majority is assured. The language of policy directives is intentionally vague, but our assumption is that the directive implicitly embraces a target for the Federal funds rate. At times the target has been explicit.
The Chairman plays key roles in FOMC deliberations as a consensus builder and as an agenda setter. By all accounts the Fed places a high value on consensus, and the Chairman must orchestrate that consensus. However, by mindfully choosing his proposed policy directive, the Chairman may be able to tilt policy choices in a direction he favors. Woolley [1984] has suggested that the Chairman may also gain some leverage over the committee through his functions as a liaison between the Fed and the outside world and as an internal allocator of Fed resources. In recognition of his distinctive sway over monetary policy, some have referred to the Chairman as the second most powerful man in Washington. lO We believe, therefore, that it is appropriate to model the Chairman as proposing a target for the Federal funds rate on which the committee votes.l1 To reflect both the consensus-building and agenda-setting roles of the Chairman in a tractable formulation, our model specifies that his proposed funds rate r t be a weighted average of his own desired rate and the mean desired rate of all other members: and ' Y is the weight attached to the Chairman's desired interest rate. We assume that the Chairman has at least as much influence as other members (-y ;: :: 1/12), and permit the possibility that he is dictatorial (-y = 1.0). Since the Chairman's proposed funds rate is ultimately adopted, r t is observed in the postmeeting period.
Once the Chairman has proposed a Federal funds rate target to the committee, the remaming members can dissent in favor of "ease," dissent in favor of "tightness," or assent. The discrete variable Va, referring to the vote by member i in meetmg t, is defined to equal -1, 1, or 0 in these three cases. 12 Because of internal pressures to present a united external front, members are apparently reluctant to dissent; they do so only when dIsagreements are acute. 13 Accordingly, we assume that a member dissents only when the difference between the proposed Federal funds rate and his desired rate exceeds a threshold level ' 1\ > O.
Condition (5a) LXXI, December 1985, p. 954] Black IS accordmgly coded as havmg dissented for tightness At the same meetmg Governor Martha Seger dissented" because she favored some reductIOn m the degree of reserve restramt m lIght of the finanCial vulnerabilIty of some sectors of the economy and m order to encourage sustamed economic expansIOn" [Federal Reserve Bulletm, 1985, p 954J Seger IS accordmgly coded as havmg dissented for easE ' 13 Henry Wallich has Said, "It IS not a pleasant thmg to have to keep dlssentmg One dissents less frequently than you would thmk After all, you are a member of a group and you want to get along With the other members" [Greider, 1987, p 201 ] Nancy Teeters vOices Similar ImpreSSIOns "Once a consensus IS formed, there IS a very strong temptatIOn to fall mIme" [Greider, 1987, p 221] Preston Martm says. "Unless you were there, an 'mslder,' you cannot comprehend the power at play m consensus bUlldmg, the frustratIOn at times m acceptmg those deCISIOns for the sake of market stabilIty, and the compellmg case at other hmes for dissent and even for takmg your vote public for reasons of conscience" [Wall Street Journal, August 5 between desired and proposed rates is less than A in absolute value, then member i assents.
We next consider estimation of the model. Parameters to be estimated include not only reaction function coefficients for Chairmen and members, but also "(, the weight attached to the Chairman's preferences in the policy process, and A, the threshold parameter for dissent voting.
C. Estimation of the Model
Substituting (1), (2), and (4) into (3) yields a reduced-form equation for the postmeeting Federal funds rate:
and This equation contains only exogenous variables; its reduced-form coefficients can be consistently estimated by ordinary least squares (OLS). Moreover, OLS can provide direct estimates of the ~kS (the coefficients of economic variables and the current President partisan dummies). Assuming that "( ;t!; 1.0, one can also test the null hypothesis of no partisan appointment effects (i.e., that Oi.k = 0 for k = 1, ... , K). It is not possible to identify all of the structural parameters in (6) from its reduced-form estimates, 14 but additional information is provided by the voting behavior of individual FOMC members.
Again considering voting behavior, we substitute (1) and (6) into conditions (5) to obtain
We can estImate M + J + K + 1 reduced-form coeffiCIents by OLS estimatIOn of (6), but the equatIOn
Conditions (7) characterize a reduced-form ordered probIt model. 15 If we normalize in the standard fashion for probit models by setting the variance of the composite error term equal to an arbitrary constant, then reduced-form coefficients of (7) can be estImated using voting data for member i. 16 Since the <XkS can be estimated, the reduced-form probit model provides an alternative test of partisan appointment effects.
Given reduced-form estimates of both (6) and (7), and given restrictions relating error variances and covariances across equations, all of the model's structural parameters can be identIfied. Even the conventional normahzation of the probit equation error variance is not required, since cross-equation restrIctions identify that parameter. Methods analogous to indirect least squares (lLS) could be used to infer structural parameters from reduced-form estimates, but ILS can yield a multiplicity of estimates, depending upon WhICh identifying restrictions are imposed in solving for structural parameters. Statistical testing is also problematic under ILS.
Full informatIOn maximum likelihood (FIML) methods provide an alternative technique for estimating systems of equations with limited dependent variablesY Because of the complexity of 15 McKelvey and Zavoma [1975] describe the ordered probit model and prOVide an applicatIOn to roll-call votmg m the U S Congress 16 The parameters of (7) can be estimated usmg a data set contammg the vote of Just one member per meetmg. Poolmg over members and time to estimate (7) would also be possIble, but the statistical propertIes of the estimates would be questIOnable because reduced-form errors are correlated across members withm a meetmg 17 Heckman [1978J and Maddala [1983] desCribe FIML estimation techniques for such models Instrumental variables methods like those proposed by Nelson and Olsen [1978] can also be used to estimate probit models WIth endogenous explanatory varIables One dIsadvantage of the mstrumental varIables methods IS that they fail to make use of cross-equation restrictIOns like those Implied by our model Co ri hI © 2001. All Ri hIs Reserved.
computing multiple integrals of multivariate normal distribution functions, FIML is feasible only when the number of limited dependent variables in the system is small. In the model considered here, twelve variables are determined in a typical meeting of the FOMC-the postmeeting Federal funds rate and the discrete votes of eleven FOMC members-making FIML estimation impractical.
A related technique based on the maximum likelihood method is feasible, however. A special feature of our model is that the probit equations determining members' votes within a meeting are identical across individuals; individual differences are captured by the series of partisan appointment dummies. Consequently, to estimate all model parameters, we need only estimate a model including one equation determining the Federal funds rate and one of eleven identical voting equations. The maximum likelihood method can be applied to the estimation of such a two-equation system. (Appendix 1 presents the likelihood function for this model.) To do so, we employ voting observations for one member per meeting, while discarding the votes of others. This does not make use of all available data, but it does impose all cross-equation restrictions; it can also be repeated using alternative sets of voting observations. For each set of estimates, hypotheses can be tested using conventional statistics based upon the likelihood function.
To carry out the estimation, we proceed in the following way.
1. For each meeting randomly draw, and assign position numbers 1 through 11 across members (without replacement). Specific individuals can be assigned different position numbers in different meetings. 2. Estimate structural parameters in (6) and (7) jointly by the maximum likelihood method, using only the over-time voting observations for members assigned the position number 1. 3. Repeat step 2 separately for members assigned the position numbers 2, 3, ... , 11. 4. Compute mean values of the estimates for each parameter over the eleven sets of estimates.
This procedure will produce eleven separate sets of consistent estimates for the model's parameters; the means of consistent estimates are also consistent.
II. THE EMPIRICAL MODEL
We now consider the empirical counterparts to equations (1) and (2). The individuals' and ChaIrmen's reaction functions are specified below:
For Governors, equation (I') includes three dummy variables to indicate the partisan identification of the appointing President. Conventionally one would identify Governors as either Republican or Democratic appointees, but Gildea [1991b, 1992] have found that the "supply-side" appointees of Ronald Reagan differ notably from the appointees of other Republican Presidents. Most studies have suggested that Republicans lean toward monetary tightness, but the Reagan appointees have been strong advocates of monetary ease. Greider [1987] concurs in his historical account, attributing the move toward easier policy in the mid-1980s to the influence of the Reagan appointees. We therefore define the three dummy variables DAP, RAP, and SSAP to mdicate Democratic appointees, traditional (i.e., non-Reagan) Republican appointees, and supply-side (i.e., Reagan) Republican appointees. Regional Bank Presidents are represented m the intercept The Chairman's equation adds dummies for Chairmen Paul Volcker, G. William Miller, and Arthur Burns (with Wilham McChesney Martin accounted for in the intercept) and drops the partisan dummies.
The President's direct partisan influence IS captured in the DCP and RCP dummy variables in each equatlOn. These dummies indicate that the current President is a Democrat or a traditlOnal Republican (with the supply-side current President represented in the intercept). Note that our model includes the conventional two-party classification as a special case in which the coefficients of RAP and SSAP are equal and the coefficient of RCP is zero.
Other independent variables in the two equations include economic indicators conventionally appearing in reaction functions To capture inertia in the policy process, the reaction functions include the last period's Federal funds rate rt-l (the average rate prevailing between meetings t -1 and t) as an Copyright © 2001 . All Rights Reserved. explanatory variable. IS Accounting for inertial effects in this fashion also reduces the potential for serial .correlation of reaction function errors.l 9 Lagged money growth M1 t -I (calculated as the growth rate of the M1 money stock over the two months preceding the meeting) enters the model because the money stock has often been an explicit intermediate target. 20 The re!llaining economic variables are forecasts of "goal" variables, P (the annualized percentage rate of inflation based on the Consumer ~rice Index), U (the percentage civilian unemployment rate), and IP (the annualized percentage rate of growth in the Federal Reserve's Index of Industrial Production).21 The forecasts are computed on the basis of data available in the month preceding the month in which meeting t occurs and have a three-month-ahead forecasting horizon. Our use of forecasts of target variables and our method of calculating these forecasts follow closely the example of Abrams, Froyen, and Waud [1980] .22 In addition to these explanatory 18 The hkehhood functIOn for the model presented m AppendIx 1 does not specifically account for the presence of a lagged dependent variable If one assumes that the last pre-sample observatIOn of the funds rate IS nonrandom, the hkehhood function we present IS appropriate EstImates wIll be consIstent m any case 19 If our model IS altered to permIt first-order serial correlation of the errors in mdlvldual reaction functions, then serIal correlatIOn wIll also be present m (6), the reduced-fonn equation explainmg the mterest rate Moreover, the serial correlation coefficIent for the reduced-fonn errors will approximate that for the mdlVldual's reactIon functIons We find that estlmatlOn of (6) by the Hiidreth-Lu method provides eVIdence of modest first-order serIal correlatIon, wIth a correlatIOn coefficIent p = 0.28 for the model correspondmg to Table I III the text Although the assumptIon that p = 0 can be rejected, correctmg for serial correlatIOn m (6) does not substantIvely alter the results of that equatIOn
We have also estimated the model usmg data that have been transformed by generalIzed dIfferencmg The results are almost Identical to those reported here, and the transformation does ehmmate eVIdence of serial correlatIOn m (6). WhIle transformmg the data does not strictly correct for serIal correlation in the context of our model, it does prOVIde eVIdence that findlllgs are robust m a more general dynamIC specIficatIOn III whIch serIal correlatIOn is less lIkely to be present Further detaIls are aVaIlable m an appendIX aVaIlable from the authors We also find that our results are robust to other alternatIve specificatIOns of the model's dynamiCs 20 Hakes and Gamber [1992] support the conclUSIOns of Abrams, Froyen, and Waud III findmg that the Fed responded to deVIatIOns of actual from targeted money growth prIOr to 1982 21 Following other reactIOn functIOn studIes, we also conSIdered exchange rates and balance of payments measures as pOSSible explanatory varIables Like most of those studIeS, we find lIttle eVIdence that mternatIonal varIables have consIstently mfiuenced monetary pohcy 22 Our forecasts are predIcted values from "rolling" regressIOn equatIOns explammg each of the three target varIables The regressIOns employed samples of 60 monthly observations prIor to the forecast penod Each forecastmg equatIOn mcluded lagged values of the unemployment rate, the rate of mfiatIon, the rate of growth of mdustnal productIOn, the growth rate of Ml, and the federal budget defiCIt as a fractIOn of GNP Lag lengths of up to three months were permItted for mcluded variables, WIth lag lengths chosen separately for the lagged dependent variable and for all other variables (as a grou~) The final lag speCIficatIon was selected on the baSIS of maximum adjusted R for a regression over the entIre sample perIod variables, estimation of the model requires data for the actual postmeeting Federal funds rate, which is measured as the average rate prevailing between meetings t and t + 1.23 (A summary of variable definitions is provIded in Appendix 2.)
Our data consist of macroeconomIC variables and individual voting records linked to 349 regular meetings 24 of the FOMC over the 1960-1987 period. 25 At a given meetmg, the voting members of the FOMC include the seven members of the Board of Governors and five of the regional Reserve Bank Presidents. After excluding the votes of the Chairman (whom our model treats as an agenda setter) and dropping observations assocIated wIth vacancIes, absences, and several uncodable dissents, the data set includes 3631 individual voting observations.
One further empirical issue requires prelimmary attention. We have argued that the Federal funds rate is appropriately viewed as the Fed's primary policy instrument over most of the sample period, but operating procedures have sometimes varied. Of particular significance is the regime of nonborrowed reserve targeting adopted in October 1979 and employed through September 1982. Over this period the Fed paId more attention to the behavior of monetary aggregates and permitted much larger funds rate fluctuations than it did in previous or subsequent periods. In preliminary empirical work our results confirmed shifts in policy rules and voting behavior in the 1979-1982 period. Because policy-making in this period does not conform well to our assumption that the funds rate is the key instrument, we have decided to exclude these meetings from further analysis (although key findings on partisan influences are in fact robust to their inclusion).26 We retain a 23 AlternatIvely, we have measured the postmeetmg mterest rate as the rate prevallmg m the first complete week after the FOMC meetmg Results are essentIally unaffected by thIs change m the specIficatIOn 24 Our sample excludes telephone meetmgs, for whIch votmg mformatlOn IS not complete over the sample period Phone meetmgs were more frequent, and ordmary meetmgs less frequent m the latter portIon of the penod, however, the average frequency ofmeetmgs IS roughly monthly for the complete sample penod 25 Havnlesky [1993) suggests that polItIcal mfluences on monetary pohcy were lImIted before 1961 Moreover, because the nature of the FOMC dIrectIve changed m 1959 to mdlcate more gradual adjustments m monetary polIcy, the meanmg of dIssents probably dIffered m the pre-and post-1960 penods Our sample also excludes the final four meetmgs m 1987, whIch occurred after Alan Greenspan became the ChaIrman 26 We found that several key parameters dIffered m the 1979-1982 perIod The reactIOn functIOn error varIance, ()'2, was larger, as was the dissent threshold parameter, A These results mdlcate greater variabIlIty m deSIred mterest rates as well as greater tolerance of deViatIOns between deSIred and proposed rates when contemplatmg dIssents Lagged money growth also had a larger coeffiCIent durmg that penod, whIch IS Table I summarizes results obtained from estimating the empirical model. Our procedure initially produces eleven estimates for each parameter; the table presents the mean estimate and the mean standard error for each parameter. 27 Sign frequencies record the number of times (out of eleven) that a parameter was positive or negative, and sIgnificance frequencies record the number of times (out of eleven) that each parameter differed significantly from zero at the 0.10 level. In the bottom panel ofthe table, similar significance frequencies are reported for tests involving comparisons of coefficients. Single-equation estimates of the reduced-form equations for this specification have also been estimated and are reported in Appendix 3. 28 The results appear to give a clear answer to the question we have posed on the channels of partisan influence. The mean coefficients indicate that, other things equal, traditional Republican appointees prefer a Federal funds rate 0.50 points higher than Democrats, who in turn prefer rates 1.13 points higher than supply-side Republicans. The difference between traditional Republicans and Democrats was significant (at the 0.10 level or better) in ten of the eleven individual estimations, while Democrats and results is mtUltlvely plaUSible gIVen the change m operatmg procedures. We find that once these shifts are allowed for, our findmgs on partisan mfluences are essentially unchanged from those reported m the text 27 Standard errors are calculated by the method of White [1982] , producmg estImates that are robust to some speCificatIOn errors The average standard errors we report are almost surely larger than the true standard errors of the average coeffiCients, thus, our mferences about statistical Significance are conservative. Standard errors for the mean estimates could til prmclple be obtained through bootstrappmg procedures, but computatIOnal costs are prohIbitive Usmg the general purpose maximum hkelihood routme in TSP, the estimatIOn reported m Table I reqUlred over seven hours of CPU tIme on an IBM 4381 mml-mainframe computer 28 We have estImated reduced-form equatIOns for other speCIfications developed III the paper, complete results of those estimatIOns are presented m an appendIX aVaIlable from the authors upon reque.st. Results from the reduced-form estImations are m all cases consistent WIth those denved from the Jomt estImatIOn procedure In addItion, we have employed a smgle-equatlOn ordered probit model to estimate the structural parameters of (7) under the (unrealistic) assumption that the adopted interest rate IS exogenous. Although these estimates are subject to a simuitam'lty bIas, they produce results conSIstent WIth our findmgs on partisan influences These results are also aVaIlable from the authors upon request. 1/11 "'DAP -aRAP = 0 10/11 "'RAP -"'SSAP = 0 11/11 "'SSAP -"'DAP = 0 9/11 (3DCP -(3RCP = 0 1/11 OVOLCKER -OBURNS = 0 1/11 OVOLCKER -OMILLER = 0 0/11 OMILLER -1iBURNS = 0 0/11 a The level of slgmficance l~ 0 10 supply-siders differed significantly in nine of eleven cases and Republicans and supply-siders differed significantly in all eleven cases. These results provide strong evidence of the importance of the power of appointment in Presidential influence over monetary policy. Evidence of direct partisan influence from the President is much weaker. A comparison of the coefficients of DCP and RCP indicates that individuals prefer a funds rate just 0.07 points lower while serving under Democrats than under Republicans. These coefficients differed significantly only once in eleven estimations. There is slightly stronger evidence of a shift in policy preferences under the supply-side President. Coefficients of DCP and RCP are consistently negative and are significantly different from zero in three of eleven cases. This indicates that members preferred higher interest rates when serving under the supply-side President than when serving under Democrats or traditional Republicans. Thus, the direct and appointment-induced impacts of the supply-side President appear to have worked in opposite directions.
The preceding result senSIbly matches the historical record. During the first Reagan administration, monetarists and conservatives, including Beryl Sprinkel at the Treasury and Martin Feldstein at the Council of Economic Advisers (CEA), directly signaled administration preferences for monetary tightness. After 1984 administration supply-siders gained the upper hand as Treasury Secretary Donald Regan shifted his stance and as key personnel changes occurred at the Treasury, the CEA, and the Federal Reserve Board. Signaling subsequently decreased as the power of appointment became the main vehicle for executive branch influence over the Fed; the post-1984 Reagan appointees to the Board led a movement toward easier monetary policies.
Although our results strongly indicate that the distinction between traditional Republicans and supply-siders is appropriately made, we have also estimated the model for the special case in which these groups are combined. These results, provided in Table  II , still show some evidence of party differences, with Republican appointees preferring tighter policies. However, both the magnitude of the estimated difference and the frequency of significance decline; the average difference was 0.25 interest rate points, and the difference was significant in just three of eleven estimations. The results again indicate that direct systematic partisan influence from the current President is negligible.
The results in Tables I and II are similar in most other respects. We find that economic conditions are related to the setting of the Fedl~ral funds rate in a manner consistent with the results of most previous reaction function studies. The lagged funds rate has a large positive coefficient, indicating the presence of inertia in the policy-making process The coefficient of lagged money growth is also positive and is usually significant, consistent with the role of money growth as an intermediate target. Coeffi- Tables I and II. Our results confirm previous studies that have suggested that Governors and Bank Presidents behave differently.29 In Table I the negative coefficients of DAP, RAP, and SSAP indicate that Democratic, Republican, and supply-side Governors all prefer a lower funds rate than Bank Presidents (who are represented in the intercept). These differences were sIgnificant in all eleven estimations for Democrats and supply-siders, and in five of eleven cases for Republicans. Similar results prevail in Table II .
The estimates also reveal information about the preferences of Chairmen. The estimated intercepts of the various Chairmen differ by large amounts, but standard errors are also large, and statistically significant differences between Chairmen are unusual. The ordering of preferences is nevertheless instructive. The results of both tables show that Volcker preferred the highest funds rates, (even though the 1979-1982 observations are deleted), followed by Miller, Martin (in the intercept), and Burns. 3o By constructing the appropriate composite intercepts, we can also compare Chairmen and representative FOMC members of various types. In Table III we report these composite intercepts in a ranking from easiest to tightest, based on the estimates reported in Table I .
Our model is distinctive in permitting the estimation of voting weights attached to the Chairman and to other members of the FOMC in the decision-making process. The Chairman's weight ' Y is estimated to be 0.158 in Table I (and it is slightly higher in Table  II ).3I Assuming a full complement of eleven other FOMC members, the implied weight. for each addit.ional member is 0.077. Thus, our estimate indicates that the Chairman has about twice as much voting weight as a rank and file member of the FOMC. This parameter is not estimated very precisely, however, and in only one of eleven estimations was ' Y significantly different from 1/ 12, the value that would imply equal weights for the Chairman and all others. The hypothesis that the Chairman is dictatorial ('Y = 1.0) is consistently rejected, however. SchweItzer [1990) report SImilar results based on the estimatlOn of a bmary probit modeL However, Tootell [1991b) fails to find significant dIfferences between Governors and PreSIdents based upon a multmomiallogit analysIs See Havnlesky [1993] for a cntique of Tootell's analysis 30 Usmg aggregate reactlOn functlOns, Hakes [1990) found evidence of a shIft m reactIOn functlOn coeffiCIents under Arthur Burns (relative to Volcker and Martm). Belden [1989) also reports evidence of changing FOMC voting patterns under the Burns Chairmanship, however, her findings are challenged by Glidea [1991a] Havnlesky [1993) reports that under Burns the Fed systematically responded to AdmIlllstratlOn SIgnalS for monetary ease but not to sIgnals for tightness Thus, the apparent polley ShIftS under Burns mIght best be attnbuted to executive branch pressures 31. We dId not Impose the constramt -y > 1/12 m the estimations summanzed m our tables; however, estimated values for -y below 1/12 were mfrequent Table I indicates that A, the threshold parameter, equals 2.15, implymg that dissents occur only when an individual's desired funds rate differs from the selected rate by more than 2.15 points. This is a large number in relation to typical shifts m postmeeting interest rates, but it is also true that dissents are quite rare, occurring on only 7.0 percent of all votes by non-Chairmen. If dissents are infrequent, our model must account for that phenomenon with a high dissent threshold. 32
IV. EXTENSIONS OF THE BASIC MODEL
The results so far support the proposition that Presidents exert systematic partisan influence on monetary policy by way of their appointments to the Board. In contrast, direct influence from the President, with the possible exception of Reagan-specIfic effects, does not appear to be strongly related to partisan ideology. In this section we consider extensions of the model m which dIrect influence from the current President might yet play an important role.
32. In an extenSIOn of the model, we have permltted errors to be correlated across members at a given meetmg. A positive correlatIOn of errors across members would provlde an alternative explanatIOn for the mfrequency of dlssents It would suggest that dlssents occur mfrequently because members often agree with one another, perhaps because they respond m similar ways to variables omitted from the model Our results with the generallzed model tended to produce estimates of -y that were ImplauSibly low (below 1/12) unless a constratnt was lmposed When-y was constratned to equal 1 / 12, the error correlatIOn was never Significantly different from zero Estimates for A were not much lower than those reported in Tables I and  II, One possibility is that influence from the President is channeled through the Chairman, but not through other FOMC members. This hypothesis is especially plausible for two reasons. First, the Chairman is generally acknowledged to be the FOMC's link to external dients, including the administration. Second, Chairmen serve only four-year terms and, to further their chances of reappointment, may be particularly responsive to the current President.
This hypothesis can be tested in a very simple way. We alter the basic model to allow the coefficients of the current President dummies, DCP and RCP, to differ for Chairmen and for all other members. If coeffieients ofthese variables differ in the Chairman's equation and if the Chairman has a large voting weight, we would conclude that direct partisan Presidential influence by way of the Chairman exists.
For the estimation reported in Table IV the coefficients ofDCP and RCP for Chairmen are given by the sums 13DcP + 13CHMDCP and I3RcP + I3cHMRcP (equivalently, I3cHMDcP and I3cHMRcP measure differences in the coefficients of Chairmen and non-Chairmen). The results for this model provide weak but suggestive evidence for the hypothesis that the Chairman is an agent of the President. The estimates reveal large upward shifts in the Chairman's intercept when the President is a traditional Republican or Democrat relative to the case where the President is a supply-sider. This suggestion of a direct Reagan influence favoring ease through the Chairman is compatible with the ease orientation of the Reagan appointees, but contrasts with our finding, discussed earlier, that the direct influence of monetarists and other nonsupply-siders in the Reagan administration encouraged tighter policy preferences among rank and file committee members. Given the confounding pressures on policy during the Reagan years and the inherent limitations of the data, one should interpret this result with caution. Table IV also provides weak evidence that Democratic and Republican Presidents exert differing partisan influences through the Chairman. The estimates imply that the Chairman's intercept shifts upward by 0.87 points when a traditional Republican replaces a Democrat in the White House. This is a large shift in the expected direction, but the difference is not statistically significant in any of the eleven estimations summarized by the table.
In a second extension ofthe model, we investigate whether the partisan identity of the current President could matter in a relaying them to the Fed, and Fed Governors, who are Presidential appointees, may then be especially responsive in their policymaking behavior. Our results indicating that Governors favor "easier" policies than Bank Presidents are consistent with the latter point. Furthermore, political loyalty may lead Governors to be more sensitive to pressure for low interest rates when they serve under a President of the same party as their appointing President. This suggests another modification of the model: allow differences in the intercepts of "in-party" and "out-party" Governors. To do so, we add the dummy OUT to the individuals' reaction function. This variable equals one for Governors appointed by a President of the out-party and otherwise equals zero.33
The intriguing results of this estimation are presented in Table V . In all eleven estimations the OUT coefficient was positive and significantly different from zero. The implication is that Governors respond to the needs of own-party Presidents by succumbing to pressures for monetary ease and that they "sabotage" opposition incumbents by promoting monetary tightness. Thus, the partisan identity of the current President does seem to matter, but not in the manner predicted by partisan business cycle models driven by ideological concerns.
The preceding results also offer an appointments-related explanation for a political monetary policy cycle. When partisan change occurs, appointees of the preceding administration push for higher interest rates under the new opposition administration, and this produces early-term tightness. As time passes, the composition ofthe Board shifts toward appointees ofthe current President, and pressures for lower interest rates mount. According to this view, pre-election ease occurs not because a new election is imminent, but because the last election is further in the past.34
Thus far, we have found only weak evidence to support the view that direct Presidential influence generates partisan movements in monetary policy choices. However, Woolley [1984, p. 109] reports that "there is a substantial consensus that presidents generally get the monetary policy they want from the Federal Reserve."35 Together, these findings suggest that Presidential 33 GlVen the focus on pohtIcal loyalty (not Ideology) in thiS argument, we have considered Reagan as a Repubhcan m defimng thiS variable 34. The conventIOnal argument for pohtIcal monetary cycles contends that an m?-mment electIon mduces PreSIdential pressures on the Fed for ease, which in turn stimulates the economy and gratifies voters (cf. note 2)
35. An anonymous Fed official has directly acknowledged that pohtIcal SignalS are heeded: "We beheve that credit conditIOns are reasonable. We aren't gettmg any Signals from pohtIcmns I can't see any reason to deviate from current pohcy" [Wall Street Journal, July 21, 1980] pressures might be effective wlthout being systematically partisan, a possibility which we investigate in a third extension of our model.
To investigate this hypothesis, we drop the current President partisan dummies from the model's reaction functions and replace them with the SAFER index (Signaling from the Administration to Copyright © 2001 . All Rights Reserved. the Federal Reserve) described by Havrilesky [1988b Havrilesky [ , 1993 . The SAFER index measures Presidential preferences by coding statements made by administration spokesmen and reported in the financial press. The index is calculated as the monthly sum of Wall Street Journal articles reporting statements advocating easier monetary policy (coded 1.0) and tighter monetary policy (coded -1.0). Our reaction functions employ SAFERt-I. the value of SAFER calculated for the month preceding the month of the FOMC meeting. Clearly, the statements coded by SAFER need not follow consistent partisan patterns; in fact, frequencies of ease and tightness signals are similar across administrations.
Results for the SAFER-augmented model are reported in Table VI . In each of the eleven estimations summarized there, the SAFER coefficient was negative and significantly different from zero, in accord with the view that monetary policy accommodates the desires expressed by Presidential signaling. These results confirm and strengthen those reported by Havrilesky, who found that SAFER influenced money growth in the 1979-1984 period [1988b] and the Federal funds rate in the 1964-1991 period [1993] . The results permit us to reconcile our conclusions with the conventional view that Presidential pressures influence monetary policy choices, but they also leave an unanswered question. Why does partisan ideology appear to play an important role in the appointment of Governors but not in patterns of direct Presidential influence?
V. CONCLUSIONS U sing a methodology that permits the estimation of individual reaction function parameters, we have analyzed partisan influences exerted by U. S. Presidents on individual members of the FOMC. Our results strongly suggest that the power to make appointments provides an important channel of systematic partisan influence. We find that Democratic appointees favor easier monetary policies than traditional RepUblicans do, and that supplyside Republicans prefer even easier policies than Democrats do. Regional Reserve Bank Presidents tend to prefer tighter policies than the politically appointed Governors.
Evidence of systematic and direct partisan influence of the current President on Fed Governors is weaker in our estimations, but this does not imply that Presidents have no direct influence over the Fed. In this paper we find some evidence of direct 1/11 "'DAP -"'RAP = 0 8/11 "'RAP -asSAP = 0 11/11 "'SSAP -"'DAP = 0 9/11 llvOLCKER -bBL"RNS = 0 3/11 bVOLCKER -llMILLER = 0 1/11 llMILLER -llBuRNs = 0 1/11 a The level of slgmficance IS 0 10
Reagan-specIfic effects and suggestions that Presidents exert partisan influence through the Chairman. Moreover, Presidential signaling appears to be effective without being either continual or systematically partisan. 36 36 Havnlesky [1991] notes that sIgnalIng IS Itself sensItive to the state of the economy and the partIsan compOSItIOn of the Board of Governors, as well as the shIftIng preferences of PresidentIal admlmstrations For example, signalIng was persistent during Nixon's first term, Carter's term, and Reagan's first term when each faced a troubled economy and a Board domillated by out-party appoilltees However, signalIng fell off durIng Reagan's second term and durIng Gerald Ford's Interregnum, as economic condItIOns Improved and as the Board came to have a friendlIer partisan composItIon Co ri hI © 2001. All Ri hIs Reserved.
Our analysis also suggests that strategic political motives are relevant in explaining FOMC voting patterns. Partisan-appointed Governors desire higher interest rates when serving under a President of the opposing party than they do when serving under an own-party President. Given the timing of the appointments process, this politically motivated behavior could produce an apparent electoral cycle in monetary policies.
The institutional arrangements governing Federal Reserve decision-making reflect a balancing of concerns: policymakers should simultaneously be accountable to the public and be resistant to immediate political pressures. To evaluate the balancing of those concerns on the basis of empirical evidence requires an analysis of behavior at the level of individual decision-makers. Our analysis takes a step in that direction; it confirms the importance of partisanship in appointments for the conduct of monetary policy. Further study of the microfoundations of Fed decision-making may ultimately provide a basis for evaluating different appointment procedures and other proposed institutional changes.
APPENDIX I: THE LIKELIHOOD FUNCTION FOR THE MODEL
Appendix 1 provides the likelihood function for the estimated model. For each meeting t, assume that we observe two endogenous variables: a postmeeting interest rate and the vote of a single FOMC member on the monetary policy directive. We arbitrarily denote the member whose vote is observed as member i.
We begin by compactly reformulating equations (6) and (7). Equation (6) can be rewritten as
where Zt is a vector of exogenous variables, 'IT is a vector of reduced-form coefficients, and U t is the composite error term:
Conditions (7) characterizing the probit voting model can be compactly reformulated as
Here Wa is a vector of exogenous variables, e is a vector of reduced-form coefficients, and V,t is the composite error term:
Let g (ut,v,t) be the joint density of U t and V,t. ThIs density is bivariate normal with variances and covariance given below:
The joint density of the observed variables, r t and V'I> can be defined for each of three cases J E {I,II,III}. The joint density relevant for case J is denoted hJ (rt,v,t) .
When v,t = -1, then V,t > A -W,tE}, and the joint density hj (rt,vzt) is given by A joint density can be expressed as a product of marginal and conditional densities, enabling us to rewrite this equation as When v,t = 1, then Va < -A -W,tE), and the joint density hn (rl> V,t) is given by Dummy variables equal to one for meetings when the indicated Chairman served; otherwise equal to zero.
A dummy variable equal to one for Democratic appointees; otherwise equal to zero.
A dummy variable equal to one if the President when meeting t occurs is a Democrat; otherwise equal to zero. The three-month-ahead forecast of the growth rate of the Federal Reserve's Index of Industrial Production; calculated at time t using information available in the month prior to meeting t.
The annualized percentage rate of growth of the money supply; measured as the difference in log Ml over the two months preceding meeting t.
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A dummy variable equal to one for members appointed by a President of the party not currently occupying the Presidency; otherwise equal to zero. The three-month-ahead forecast of the rate of inflation (the annualized percentage rate of change in the Consumer Price Index); calculated at time t using information available in the month prior to meetmg t.
The average Federal funds rate prevailing in the interval between meeting t and meeting t + 1.
The average Federal funds rate prevailing in the interval between meeting t -1 and meeting t.
A dummy variable equal to one for traditional (i.e., non-Reagan) Republican appointees; otherwise equal to zero. A dummy variable equal to one if the President when meeting t occurs is a traditional (non-Reagan) Republican; otherwise equal to zero. For the month preceding the month in which meeting t occurs, the sum of Wall Street Journal articles reporting administration statements favoring easier monetary policy (coded 1.0) and tighter monetary policy (coded -1.0). A dummy variable equal to one for supply-side Republican appomtees (i.e., Reagan appointees), otherwise equal to zero. The three-month-ahead forecast of the unemployment rate; calculated at time t using information available m the month prior to meeting t.
A discrete variable indicating the vote of FOMC member l in meeting t; equal to -1.0 for a dissent favoring ease, 1.0 for a dissent favoring tightness, and 0 for an assent.
APPENDIX 3: SINGLE-EQUATION ESTIMATES OF REDUCED-FoRM

EQUATIONS
As noted in the text, it is possible to estimate the reduced form given by (6) and (7) with single-equation estimation methods. Equation (6), explaining the postmeeting Federal funds rate, can be estimated by ordinary least squares; mequalities (7) can be estimated as an ordered pro bit model. In Table VII reduced-form estimates for the model corresponding to Table I in the text.
Estimates ofthe OLS equation employ 323 time series observations corresponding to FOMe meetings from 1960-1987 (excluding the 1979-1982 period of nonborrowed reserve targeting). For the ordered probit model, two sets of estimates are provided. First, we provide estimates that use data pooled over all 3352 voting observations. Alternatively, we provide averages of estimates obtained from eleven mutually exclusive subsets of the data, such that only one vote per meeting is included in each data subset. This is done because error terms are correlated across members within a meeting, so that pooling results in a violation of an assumption of the ordered pro hit model. For the ordered probit model we normalize by setting au = 1.0 and adopt the sign convention that 
